What’s the use of arguing? European Union strategies for the promotion of human rights in the United Nations by Kissack, Robert
  1
European Union Studies Association Biennial Conference 2009, LA 
What’s the use of arguing? European Union strategies for the promotion of 
human rights in the United Nations 
 
Dr Robert Kissack 
Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals 
rkissack@ibei.org 
April 2009 
    Draft text: not for citation 
 
Abstract: 
 
This paper explores two themes raised by the recent ECFR Audit of European Power in the UN, where 
it is argued that a group of states constituting an ‘Axis of Sovereignty’ is frustrating European efforts to 
promote human rights in the multilateral framework of the UN. The first is the extent to which 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘multilateralism’ are antagonistic concepts, drawing on the writings of Ruggie, 
Kratochwil and Reus-Smit. Through them it is shown that the relationship is more complicated than 
simple opposition, and instead the two have emerged from specific historical processes in the modern 
international system. The second part of the paper analyses the newly emerging EU process of human 
rights promotion in the UNGA through building a multi-regional constituency of states supporting 
progressive HR norms, firstly through common statements and later through UNGA resolutions. It is 
shown that one of the most important elements in explaining the successful outcome of these 
campaigns (to date) is the orchestrated defence of the resolution through carefully prepared arguments. 
The ‘power’ of argumentation is analysed through three prisms; as normative power (Manners), as the 
logic of argumentation (Risse), and as rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig). It is argued that each one 
contributes a level of explanation as to how the concentric circles of influence around the EU are 
influenced by the process of argumentation, according to (a) the degree to which norms are pre-
existing, (b) willingly internalised at the national level, or (c) remain unaccepted but were 
unchallenged. The paper ended by offering some tentative suggestions towards an evolved set of 
fundamental institutions (Reus-Smit) in which a new concept of post-Westphalian sovereignty might 
be coupled to a norm of procedural justice favouring solidarist over pluralism.  
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In 2008 the European Council of Foreign Relations published An Audit of European 
Power in the UN (Gowan & Brantner 2008), arguing that over last decade the EU had 
slipped from more often being in the majority coalition on important human rights 
(HR) issues in the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, and the 
Commission for Human Rights (and its successor the Human Rights Council), to 
more often being in the minority. Conversely, China’s trajectory has been in the 
opposite direction, and now finds itself on the winning side on many issues. The story 
is an alarming one, it is said, because European demise and Chinese rise, and with it 
the emergence of an ‘Axis of Sovereignty’, marks a watershed moment in 
international human rights protection and will lead to the erosion of fundamental 
human rights norms and practices as states less disposed to HR protection ascend. 
This analysis raises many interesting questions concerning the interpretation of the 
results, the methodology used, and the theoretical implications drawn from them.  
 
The ambitions of this paper are limited to two things. The first is to critically 
assess the frequently used binary between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘multilateralism’, where 
the former is (in the opinion of this author) wrongly juxtaposed as the antithesis of the 
latter. While much of the recent literature on multilateralism and the EU has been 
polarised through the lens of ‘effective multilateralism’ described in the 2003 
European Security Strategy, there is a richer International Relations literature that 
brings deeper insight to the concepts. The literature considered here are Ruggie 
(1993), Kratochwil (1993, 2006), and Reus-Smith (1997). The second ambition is to 
address the policy-relevant question raised in the ECFR Audit, namely how to go 
about winning the argument for greater human rights protection in the UN, and 
specifically in the UNGA. Using two cases studies from the last three UNGA 
Sessions (61-63) on (i) the Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty and (ii) the 
Promotion of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Rights, the paper 
considers three EU strategies for promoting a ‘progressive’ human rights agenda. 
These are informed by (i) normative power Europe (Manners 2002), (ii) the logic of 
argumentation (Risse 2000), and (iii) rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig 2001).  By 
way of conclusion the role of argumentation is presented as part of a reconfiguring of 
the fundamental institutions of the modern international society of states (Reus-Smit 
1997). 
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I. ‘Effective multilateralism’ and ineffective sovereignty? 
 
In December 2003 the European Council published the European Security Strategy, 
in which it stated that  
our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. … 
Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act 
effectively, is a European priority. (Council of the European Union, 2003: 9) 
Since then, the term has become a focal point for the study of the EU in the 
multilateral system, in effect kick-starting a new generation of literature ruminating 
on this concept and what it means for the foreign policy of the EU.
1 One angle of 
investigation has been from a pragmatic, policy orientation, exemplified in the edited 
volumes by the Foreign Policy Centre (2004) and the EUISS (Ortega 2005). Sven 
Biscop initially identified ‘effective multilateralism’ as a form of governance 
concerned with the delivery of global goods, stating that ‘Effective Multilateralism = 
Global Governance’ (Biscop 2004: 27). More recently his views have evolved and 
now regards it as ‘enforceable multilateralism’ (Biscop & Drieskens 2006: 273). A 
second approach found in the literature is edited case-studies across a range of UN 
bodies (thus excluding the WTO from analysis), such as Wouters, Hoffmeister and 
Ruys soliciting of practitioner accounts (2006) or Laatikainen and Smith’s focus on 
the performance of the EU at the UN through the prism of ‘intersecting 
multilateralisms’ (2006). They provide a three-fold definition of ‘effectiveness’ as (i) 
the EU as an actor, (ii) the EU in the UN, and (iii) the EU’s contribution to UN 
effectiveness (Laatikainen and Smith 2006: 9-10). This is becoming a widely 
accepted framework used in the literature (Oberthuer 2009). More recently, Jorgensen 
has edited a larger collection of essays looking at the EU in the wider multilateral 
institutional setting (2009). A third angle of investigation is the critical interrogation 
of the relationship between ‘effective’ and ‘multilateralism’ drawing on IR literature. 
Elgstrom, Gerlach and Smith (2007) choose to explore effective multilateralism 
through the lens of the EU’s existing and considerable ongoing interaction with 
international regimes. They draw on work by John Ruggie to point to the constructed 
nature of regimes and the role of sociological institutionalism in explaining the 
performance of regimes over time. Elsewhere, Peterson, Aspinwall, Damro and 
Boswell (2008) have designed a research project exploring ‘The Consequences of 
Europe: Multilateralism and the New Security Agenda’, importantly introducing a 
historical dimension to the evolving nature of multilateralism over time. Despite this 
blossoming interest in effective multilateralism, Benjamin Kienzle points to the 
plurality of opinions over what it really constitutes, linking this to competing 
expectations about what it is intended to achieve (2008). In his view, effective 
                                                 
1 The first wave of literature on the EU in the UN system responded to the creation of the CONUN 
working group in 1973, spearheaded by Hurwitz (1975), Foot (1979) and Lindemann (1982). Luif 
revisited this work in 2003 and updated the findings, months prior to the ESS publication. The second 
wave focuses on the external representation of the EU through the Community competency, most 
obviously in the GATT and WTO, for example M. Smith (1998), Meunier and Nicolaidis (1999), 
Kerromans (2006), van de Hoven (2006), Young (2007). For further discussion see Kissack 
(forthcoming) Majority, Consensus, Privilege and Persuasion: The European Union and 
Multilateralism, Palgrave, London.    4
multilateralism is a self-serving concept that helped to unite the EU after the divisions 
over the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
 
The division between ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Europe, caused by differing national 
positions within the EU and accession states concerning the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003 (and wilfully accentuated by the US administration at the time), casts a long 
shadow over the ESS.
2 The document was invariably read as an alternative 
weltanschaung to the 2002 US National Security Strategy (Berenskoetter 2005) and 
contextualised within the wider debate over the disintegration of the transatlantic 
alliance in particular and the West in general (Peterson and Pollack 2003, Calleo 
2004, Cox 2005). Given that the neoconservative policy circles close to the White 
House were advocating US unilateralism, (and by 2005 the fervently anti-UN John 
Bolton had been appointed US ambassador to the UN), it is unsurprising that 
multilateralism became a core theme resonating throughout the EU strategy. As a 
sticking-plaster applied to the gapping wound of the post Iraq fallout, which as the 
ECFR Audit notes was felt by EU member states for a number of years afterwards, 
‘effective multilateralism’ was a obvious place to begin, not least because 
‘multilateralism is in the DNA’ of Europe (Jorgensen 200X). The use of the 
multilateralism/unilateralism binary as a moniker for the differences between Europe 
and the US was reinforced by the Venus/Mars distinction used by Robert Kagan to 
describe Europe’s aversion to the use of military force and American willingness 
(2003). It also fits Robert Cooper’s thesis emphasising the centrality of international 
law in the relations between EU member states, and with European states with the 
wider world (Cooper 2000). By contrast American unilateralism regards international 
law as an unnecessary inhibition on US power and will ignore it when pursuing its 
national interests. The EU multilateral identity is consolidated by the othering of the 
US: unilateralism, realpolitik, military-minded, unencumbered by international law.
3 
It is unsurprising with these shorthand notations in circulation that ‘sovereignty’ is 
seen in opposition to multilateralism. By extension, a vigorous assertion of sovereign 
rights is portrayed as hindering the effectiveness of multilateralism, summed up by 
the identification of the ‘Axis of Sovereignty’ mentioned above.  
 
As I shall proceed to argue, the term ‘Axis of Sovereignty’, although catchy, is 
at best a misnomer and at worst orientates the discussion on how the EU should go 
about pursuing a progressive, pro-HR agenda in the UNGA in the wrong direction. 
Let us begin by finding a more appropriate name for the group of states intent on 
scuppering HR promotion. The argument about sovereignty revolves around the legal 
                                                 
2 The public divisions over Iraq are probably starker than the policy differences between EU member 
states, in terms of reconcilability. Gordon and Shapiro’s in depth study of the build-up to the invasion 
note that a clash of the magnitude felt ‘was far from inevitable. It resulted not just from structural 
trends, but also from a strong degree of contingency, personality, misguided diplomacy, poor 
leadership, Iraqi unpredictability and bad luck’ (2004: 8). In this regard the replacement of Blair, 
Chirac and Schroeder with Brown, Sarcoxie and Merkel is very much the clean slate it appears. 
3 Robert Keohane challenges the assumption that ‘effective multilateralism’ and unilateral are 
immiscible. ‘Indeed, one of the most striking features of effective multilateralism in the 20
th century is 
that it has often been precipitated by unilateral actions by powerful states’ (2006: 59) [emphasis in 
original].   5
and political interpretation of the phrase ‘intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.
4 The 
accepted exception to this rule is the implementation of UN Security Council 
resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in response to threats to 
international peace and security. However, deciding what constitutes such a threat is a 
political decision taken by the members of the UNSC. Chinese refusal to sanction 
UNSC action in the wake of the floods in Myanmar in 2008, or in the civil war in 
Sudan exemplify the behaviour that Gowan and Brantner have in mind when they 
place it in the axis (2008: 11). Nevertheless, on these grounds ‘Axis of non-
intervention’ would appear a more accurate label. The English School tradition of IR 
suggests the labels ‘Axis of Pluralism’ or ‘Axis of Order’, the former in opposition to 
solidarism and the latter opposed to the promotion of justice based on equality of 
individuals. Robert Keohane takes another line of attack against sovereignty, as part 
of a larger discussion of legitimacy in multilateral organisations.  
Many countries in the United Nations are either undemocratic or only partly democratic. We 
should not expect that the policies they enunciate will be in the interest of their publics, rather 
than simply of an unaccountable elite. (Keohane 2006: 70)  
Due to the fact that membership of the UN is based on the ‘doctrine of sovereignty 
that has profoundly anti-democratic origins’ lying ‘in monarchy not democracy’ 
(Keohane 2006: 65/74), ‘[i]nclusiveness of states is not an unalloyed virtue if it means 
that non-democracies can express preferences that are not desired by, or in the 
interests of most people residing within their territories’ (Keohane 2006: 74). In short, 
the problem is not sovereignty per se, but that particular (undemocratic) sovereign 
states are given an equal voice to democratic ones. This is indeed a problem if the EU 
is attempting to get its policies promoted through a recourse to voting, but as shall be 
discussed below, narrowly won and lost recorded votes are not the basis of sustained 
adherence to human rights norms.  
 
Looking into IR constructivist literature we find a number of authors who do 
not accept that sovereignty and multilateralism are antagonistic or oppositional. John 
Ruggie’s 1992 article Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution sets out a 
definition of multilateralism that is widely cited to this day. He begins with the 
observation that multilateralism has quantitative and qualitative elements. The 
quantitative element is that multilateralism coordinated  
relations between three or more states’ and rapidly incorporates the first of three qualitative 
elements ‘on the basis of “generalized” principles of conduct for a class of action, without 
regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in 
any specific moment.’ (Ruggie 1992: 571) 
Adding substance to this are two more qualitative elements, namely that ‘generalized 
organising principles logically entail an indivisibility among members’ [emphasis 
added] and that ‘successful cases of multilateralism in practice appear to generate 
among their members what Keohane has called expectations of “diffuse reciprocity” 
                                                 
4 The article reads: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.’   6
(Ruggie 1992: 571). The ‘qualitative’ elements are not merely characteristics 
describing particular interstate relations, rather they reflect a deeper ontological 
position held by Ruggie that relations between states need to be understood through a 
social theory instead of an individual-rationalist perspective. The ‘concept of 
multilateralism here refers to the constitutive rules that order relations in given 
domains of international life – their architectural dimension, so to speak. … In short, 
multilateralism here depicts the character of an overall order of relations among 
states; definitionally is says nothing about how that order is achieved’ [Emphasis in 
original] (Ruggie 1992: 572). Elsewhere, Ruggie has used the same social 
construction ontology to argue that sovereignty is another constitutive rule of modern 
international relations (1993b), of crucial importance because it establishes the mode 
of differentiation between constituent units. As Christian Reus-Smit says, in ‘societies 
of states, the organizing principle of sovereignty differentiates political units on the 
basis of particularity and exclusivity, creating a system of territorially demarcated, 
autonomous centres of political authority’ (Reus-Smit 1997: 567). Ruggie ‘draws a 
clear connection between the foundational principle of sovereignty, the social identity 
of the state, and the nature of fundamental institutions’, of which multilateralism is 
one (Reus-Smit 1997: 562).  
 
Friedrick Kratochwil (2006) takes the argument one step further than Ruggie, 
arguing that state sovereignty is a form of multilateralism because it is a ‘status, that 
is, as ascription by others’ (Kratochwil 2006: 144). The representation of sovereignty 
as an societal norm rather than an a priori attribute of the units of the system as 
assumed by realist theory has been one of the primary lines of argument advanced by 
English School scholars and constructivists alike, but Kratochwil here posits that the 
societal element of intersubjective norms and values is an early form of 
multilateralism. ‘To that extent “multilateralism” in its earliest manifestations was 
part of the “politics of recognition” that characterized the “sovereignty” game 
subsequent to the Westphalian settlement’ (Kratochwil 2006: 141). Also of 
importance are the ‘anti-hegemonic and anti-imperial dimensions’ derived from the 
separation of external and internal politics (Kratochwil 2006: 145). ‘While the 
individual sovereign could rule by the grace of God – and indeed this formula 
continued to legitimize traditional rule well into the nineteenth century – no such 
pretentions were acceptable in the international realm’ (Kratochwil 2006: 146). Thus 
the international relations of the Westphalian state system incorporating mutual 
recognition and non-interference in domestic politics were the first example of 
multilateralism in the modern era. The Concert of great powers initiated with the 1815 
Congress of Vienna was the second. There multilateralism changes ‘from a 
minimalist to a more institutionalized form: the notion of a “great power”. Thus while 
multilateralism still retains in a way its counter-hegemonic dimension, it is now a 
multilateralism of a somewhat restricted scope’ (Kratochwil 2006: 148). Great powers 
met frequently and performed particular roles that helped maintain the overall system 
stability, which while not bringing about an end to unilateralism, at least ‘entailed 
some subsequent vetting of policies within the club for legitimization purposes’ 
(Kratochwil 2006: 148). In summary, Kratochwil goes beyond Ruggie’s argument 
that sovereignty and multilateralism are both intersubjective social constructs of 
states, positing instead that the practices associated with the emergence of 
Westphalian state sovereignty are examples of ‘multilateralism’s grammar’ 
(Kratochwil 2006: 143).   7
 
Christian Reus-Smith also takes a constructivist approach to the study of 
multilateralism, conceptualising it as one of the two ‘fundamental institutions’ that 
structure modern international society, the other being contractual international law 
(Reus-Smit 1997: 555). He advances two criticisms of Ruggie’s approach, as outlined 
above. The first asks why multilateralism only emerged 150 years after the modern 
Westphalian system emerged. His second is that in order to explain the type of 
multilateralism designed in the post-1945 world, Ruggie resorts to ‘a “second image” 
argument about the institutional impact of American hegemony
5’ that at the end of the 
day ‘elaborated institutional principles that were first embraced and implemented by 
the great powers almost a century earlier’ (Reus-Smit 1997: 563). Kratochwil’s 
contribution resonates with these critiques, addressing the first one through his 
assertion that mutual state recognition during the 150 years of absolutism after 1648 
constitutes a form of multilateralism preceding the period considered by Ruggie, and 
reiterating the second in his interpretation of the concert system. Yet for Reus-Smit 
Kratochwil’s answers are insufficient and instead he presents a more detailed 
explanation of why multilateralism is one of the fundamental institutions of modern 
international society, based on an analysis of the ‘constitutional structure of 
international society’. His argument is informed by the observation that ‘fundamental 
institutions differ from one society of states to another’ and that ancient Greek city-
states ‘developed a sophisticated and successful system of third-party arbitration to 
facilitate ordered interstate relations’, which he characterises as “authoritative 
trilateralism” (Reus-Smit 1997: 555). What links Greek city states to our interest in 
sovereignty and multilateralism is that it alerts us to the fact that multilateralism is the 
result of a specific set of social forces located around state sovereignty but not 
exclusively a product of sovereignty alone. For the purposes of this paper’s argument 
much of the detail can be sidestepped and a brief explanation of ‘constitutional 
structures’ and their impact on modern multilateralism will suffice. Later towards the 
end of the paper this model will be returned to in order to present a radical proposal 
for EU action in the multilateral system.  
 
Constitutional structures are coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and 
norms that perform two functions in ordering international societies: they define what 
constitutes a legitimate actor, entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they 
define the basic parameters of rightful state action. (Reus-Smit 1997: 566) 
Reus-Smit identifies ‘three intersubjective normative elements: a hegemonic belief 
about the moral purpose of centralized, autonomous political organization; an 
organizing principle of sovereignty; and a norm of pure procedural justice’ (Reus-
Smit 1997: 566). As Reus-Smit goes on to demonstrate in his comparison of ancient 
Greece and the modern state system, the three elements are linked because the moral 
purpose of the state, as defined by the principle of sovereignty, generates particular 
norms of procedural justice. The ‘raison d’être undergirding the sovereignty of 
ancient Greek city-states involved a “discursive” norm of justice, whereas the moral 
purpose sustaining the sovereignty of modern states has involved a “legislative” 
                                                 
5 Ruggie’s claim is that it was ‘American hegemony that was decisive after World War II, not merely 
American hegemony’ [Emphasis in original] (Ruggie 1992: 593).   8
conception of justice’ (Reus-Smit 1997: 568). He characterises political life in ancient 
Greece as revolving ‘around public speech and debate, the principal aim of which was 
the rational pursuit of justice’, which led to an approach to dispute settlement in 
international affairs between sovereign units through arbitration by a third party 
embodying ‘the same discursive norm of procedural justice that informed city-states’ 
domestic legal processes’ (Reus-Smit 1997: 572). By contrast, in the modern state 
system the hegemonic domestic norm spread through the Enlightenment, liberal 
political theory and capitalism production broadly definable as C. B. Macpherson’s 
‘possessive individualism’ (1962). ‘As the nineteenth century progressed, the state’s 
moral purpose was increasingly identified with augmenting individuals’ purposes and 
potentialities. This, in turn, generated a new legislative norm of procedural justice’ 
(Reus-Smit 1997: 577). Paralleling the emergent norm of the equality of all men was, 
as Kratochwil also argues, a move to recognise the sovereign equality of all states and 
regulate relations between them by rule and contract. Thus Reus-Smit arrives at his 
two fundamental institutions that structure modern international society: 
multilateralism and contractual international law. 
 
All three authors ask us to consider the deeper linkages between sovereignty 
and multilateralism, and if one is prepared to accept their social-constructivist 
ontologies then the binary opposition of the two becomes unsustainable. As I shall 
now turn to discuss, the ‘problem’ of how the EU should promote a progressive HR 
agenda in the UN is not ‘solved’ by reigning in sovereignty and in its place asserting 
more multilateralism. Instead I will consider three ways the EU can engage in 
dialogue with the wider membership of the UN, in the words of Gowan and Brantner 
to ‘erect a big tent’ (2008: 7). Informing this discussion are the 2006 Statement on the 
Death Penalty, the 2007 and 2008 resolutions in the UNGA on a Moratorium on the 
Death Penalty and the 2008 Statement on Sexual Equality. 
   9
II. Promoting a moratorium on the death penalty and LGBT rights 
 
In this section I shall consider how the EU could enter into dialogue with the wider 
membership of the UN in order to build a broad coalition in support of progressive 
human rights norms. This membership is, as Gowan and Brantner point out, 
heterogeneous insofar as it can be conceptualised as concentric circles around the core 
EU position.
6 The closest circle is composed of SAA and accession states to the East, 
as well as EEA members such as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein. 
Depending on the issue area, non-European OECD states constitute the next circle, 
with whom the EU share many common interests yet failure to reach out to them in 
coordination meetings is well documented (Smith 2006a,b).
7 South and Central 
American states are often closely aligned with the EU on human rights issues, 
constituting a wider circle of cooperation.
8 Beyond that in Asia and Africa individual 
states are targeted according to the likelihood they will be supportive, and as such are 
‘cherry-picked’. There is a degree of momentum associated with this method, and 
overcoming the first-mover dilemma can lead to gradual build-up of support. The first 
problem to explore is how can the EU move from inside the comfort-zone of a 
coalition of the ‘greater North’ mustering around 50 votes, to one that extends 
significantly outwards into the more distance spheres where 100+ states join the 
sponsoring coalition? Gaining the support of South and Central American states 
(GRULAC) is important but ultimately insufficient if not supplemented with 
members from the Africa and Asia regions. Once achieved, the second concern is how 
to move towards 130+ states’ support that puts the minority below the one-third 
level.
9 With each step the potential for a ‘dialogue with the deaf’ increases 
substantially, but in order to bring about significant improvement to human rights 
protection globally there must be more done than simply winning majority votes in 
the UNGA. 
 
The European Union first attempted to pass a resolution for the worldwide 
abolition of the death penalty in 1999, one year after successfully passing such a 
resolution in the Commission on Human Rights (Bantekas & Hodgkinson 2000, 
Kissack 2008b). That degenerated into an unmitigated failure in the eyes of everyone 
bar a few optimistic Italian commentators, whose opinion was coloured by the fact 
that Italy was not only the major driving force behind the drafting process, but also 
the reason why it came so close to being counterproductive and damaging 
                                                 
6 Reaching a ‘core EU position’ is in itself no easy feat, as I have described in detail elsewhere for the 
drafting of the Death Penalty resolution in 2007. (Kissack 2008b) 
7 On the issue of the death penalty, Japan and the USA do not support the EU moratorium.  
8 The GRULAC members are opposed to the EU on economic development questions, siding with the 
G77. Caribbean states are among the strongest advocates of retaining the death penalty.  
9 The figure ‘100’ is significant because with 192 members in total, a resolution requires 97 votes in 
favour to be adopted by simple majority, and is the number cited by Amnesty International as needed 
before it would endorse a resolution on the death penalty. 130 is the threshold for a two-third majority, 
regarded by some as more legitimate than one-third (mostly G77 states that can gather this many 
votes). However, the extent to which either is legitimate is debatable, complicated by the questions of 
‘legitimacy’ and ‘consensus’. On these see Claude (1966), Buzan (1981), Franck (1990), Clark (2003), 
Keohane (2006) and for a discussion Kissack (2009b).    10
abolitionists’ plans. In the UNGA Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and 
Cultural) a group of retentionist states attempted to insert an amendment into the text 
of the resolution asserting the primacy of Article 2(7) of the Charter. Such 
amendments, referred to colloquially by diplomats as ‘wrecking amendments’, seek to 
secure the primacy of state sovereignty and deny that there is a human rights element 
to the issue. In the words of a leading Amnesty International campaigner, this would 
set their death penalty project back ten years.
10 Italy, according to Bantekas and 
Hodgkinson’s account, were on the cusp of agreeing to this when the resolution was 
instantly dropped and there was no further discussion (Bantekas & Hodgkinson 2000: 
29). In their defence, the supporters of Italian actions argue that putting the item on 
the agenda on the Third Committee was an important achievement. However, the EU 
retreated to the relatively permissive environment of the CHR and continued 
authoring resolutions against the death penalty until the Commission’s reform in 
2005/06. These events cemented the reputation of the UNGA as being under the sway 
of the global South, while the numerical skew on CHR membership towards the 
WEOG and GRULAC members gave the EU and its closest circles of ‘friends’ the 
ability to win recorded votes (Smith 2006b, 2008; Gowan and Brantner 2008: XX) 
However, when the newly formed Human Rights Council emerged with its 
reweighted regional representation favouring Asia and Africa over WEOG, Eastern 
Europe and GRULAC, the EU found itself in repeatedly in the minority.  
 
In 2006 the Finnish EU Presidency began circulating a draft statement to be 
read out in the UN General Assembly setting out the reasons for seeking to abolish 
the death penalty. The statement read out by Finland in the General Assembly was on 
behalf of 84 other states, establishing that there was sufficient concern for the issue to 
place it on the agenda of the Third Committee the following year.
11 The German 
Presidency of the first semester of 2007 held preliminary discussions on how to 
maintain momentum, but progress was limited and there was still no agreement on a 
common position as the Portuguese assumed the Presidency and preparations for the 
62
nd Session began in New York. Against the advice of Amnesty International (who 
demanded evidence of at least 100 states willing to co-sponsor the resolution as a sign 
of certain success), and from a very slow start the EU member states began 
                                                 
10 This view is also expressed by EU and non-EU diplomats working in the UNGA Third Committee. I 
would like to thank the 22 diplomats and NGO representatives who talked to me during the week 31 
March - 4 April 2008, and 16 -20 February 2009. Personal interviews were carried out under the 
Chatham House Rule, and thus to maintain their anonymity no references to their nationalities are 
made. 
11 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/ga10562.doc.htm (Accessed 8 April 2009) The 84 states 
were: Albania, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Timor-Leste, Turkey, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu and Venezuela. 
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establishing a common position between the staunch abolitionists (led by Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Sweden) and the pragmatists willing to accept less (led by Italy). 
Importantly, however, the decision was made to form a group of ten co-authors 
consisting of two states from each of the five UN regions.
12 Firstly, this demonstrated 
that lessons had been learnt from the 1999 episode because draft resolutions are 
received with greater hostility when they are perceived as being authored exclusively 
by the EU. One African diplomat summed up the credibility problem facing the EU 
by saying that their national position was to disagree first and then decide why later, 
and said the same approach is often taken by the African Group and Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference too. Secondly, the decision that only Portugal would 
participate in the co-authorship meetings gave important leverage to the Presidency to 
galvanise agreement within the EU. Early co-authors meetings left the nine non-EU 
states frustrated by the negotiation constraints placed on the Portuguese and 
unconvinced about their actual authorship of the resolution. Upmost in their minds 
was avoiding the accusation of being ‘puppets’ of the EU and consequently asserted 
their own will on the text of the resolution, changing Portugal’s role from that of a 
highly constrained intermediary between two authorship groups into an equal player 
among the ten and more of a messenger back to the 27. Some diplomats amongst the 
27 felt that the EU lost control of the authorship process; however, what cannot be 
denied is the ultimate success of the resolution. Widely recognised among EU and 
non-EU diplomats alike are the factors that contributed to the successful passing of 
the resolution. The first was the cross-regional co-authorship that framed the 
resolution as a universally acceptable human rights norm, rather than allowing 
detractors to portray it as Western. Secondly, the Portuguese Presidency orchestrated 
a choreographed and comprehensive defence of all conceivable amendments that the 
retentionist states could have tabled, preparing the interventions for a wide spectrum 
of co-authoring and co-sponsoring states. The pitfall of 1999 was avoided and when 
put to a recorded vote in the General Assembly the resolution was passed.
13  
 
In 2008 the process was repeated with a view to consolidating support rather 
than upping the pressure on retentionist states by calling for an outright ban in the 
place of a moratorium, contrary to some of their expectations. One unexpected 
difference was the relatively minor role played by the French Presidency, at times 
seeming almost invisible to both EU and non-EU states.
14 Chile assumed the role of 
primus inter pares in the co-authors and coordinated the defence of the resolution 
from hostile amendments. On reflection many EU diplomats were surprised that the 
retentionist states did not offer any new lines of attack, and the same responses 
sufficed as for last year. Once again, the resolution was passed, with a slightly large 
                                                 
12 The ten states were: Angola and Gabon (Africa), Philippines and Timor-Leste (Asia), Albania and 
Croatia (Eastern Europe), Brazil and Mexico (South America) New Zealand and Portugal (WEOG). 
13 The resolution calling for a moratorium on the death penalty (A/62/439/Add.2) was adopted by a 
recorded of vote of 104 in favour to 54 against, with 29 abstentions. 18 December 2007, (76
th & 77
th 
Meetings). See UN press document GA10678. 
14 This is put down to the fact that shortly before the beginning of the 63
rd Session a new French 
diplomat was posted to New York and thrown in at the deep end. What is surprising about this is that in 
2007 EU member states were considering whether to postpone action on the death penalty until the 
2008 French Presidency under the assumption that it could muster considerably more resources than 
the Portuguese.     12
vote in favour, and a noticeable shift from votes against to abstentions.
15 Key to our 
analysis is the strategy of EU action, from statement to resolution, and then the 
consolidation of the majority behind it in the following year. To what extent is this a 
model for future action, and how does it work? 
 
At the 63
rd Session of the UNGA in 2008 a group of 66 states (including all 
EU member states, many WEOG and GRULAC members, as well as a few African 
and Asian states)
16 presented a statement to the General Assembly calling for the full 
implementation of fundamental human rights irrespective of sexual identity.
17 The 
statement was intended to raise awareness of the discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people around the world, and presented this as a 
failure to respect the human rights of all people and as such a failing of the universal 
aspirations of human rights norms. In a manner similar to that of the death penalty, 
the promotion of a distinct LGBT resolution was initiated by Brazil in 2003 in the 
Commission on Human Rights, and more recently New Zealand and Norway have 
authored resolutions in the HRC. Building on this initiative a core group of states 
(France, the Netherlands, Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, Gabon and Norway) began 
drafting a statement for the 2008 UNGA with the intention of canvassing co-
signatures from like-minded states (from the five UN regions). The EU was 
‘represented’ by the French and the Dutch but diplomats who worked on the 
statement note that the EU presence was barely noticeable at times, and the project 
was driven forcefully by the French from Paris and Rama Yade, the Minister of State 
with responsibility for Foreign Affairs and Human Rights, as well as the Dutch 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Maxime Verhagen.
18 The statement was read to the 
General Assembly by the Argentine Ambassador and minimised the visibility of the 
EU in the process.
19 This is a fair reflection of the actual drafting process; EU 
involvement was insufficient for this to be accurately described as an EU initiative in 
the way that the death penalty resolution can be. This is partly due to non-EU co-
authors learning from the death penalty drafting experience that they must be fully 
active from the beginning, and partly also due to the political capital invested in this 
issue by France and the Netherlands granting them a high-profile role.  
 
                                                 
15 The resolution before the plenary (A/63/430/Add.2) was adopted on 18 December 2008 by a 
recorded vote of 106 in favour to 46 against, with 34 abstentions. 
16 Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, 
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Timor-Leste, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
17 http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/pressroom/pressrelease/826.html (accessed 31 March 
2009) 
18 The French Presidency set up a website dedicated to this: 
http://www.droitslgbt2008.fr/acueil/index.php (accessed 31 March 2009). 
19 http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/ga/63/2008/ga081218am.rm (accessed 31 March 2009).   13
Is the LGBT statement of 2008 where the death penalty was in 2006? Given 
the successful adoption of the resolution in 2007, will the EU and the likeminded co-
authors choose to follow the same pathway and present a resolution in the Third 
Committee in 2009? Two factors at present suggest that this will not be the case at 
least this year. Firstly there are nearly twenty fewer signatures on the LGBT statement 
than there were in 2006, although that statement called for an abolition of the death 
penalty that was subsequently ‘weakened’ to a call for a moratorium, making it easier 
for wavering states to accept it. Secondly, the IOC coordinated a very strongly 
worded counter-statement setting out their objections to the LGBT statement that took 
its supporters by surprise; although they expected a response they did not envisage it 
to be so blunt.
20 For pragmatic states within the LGBT coalition, some wonder if it is 
worth spending the political capital on fighting this battle if it will raise such ill will 
among UN members.
21 Diplomats involved in the core-drafting process are non-
committal about the prospects of a resolution next year, while opponents are firmly of 
the opinion that this is the beginning of another drive towards a resolution and that the 
incremental ‘death penalty process’ will be repeated. Despite the similarities in the 
process, there remains a categorical difference between the death penalty and LGBT 
rights, with the latter framed as ensuring universal application of existing, accepted 
human rights norms (and targeting discrimination leading to systematic violation of 
those rights of the LGBT minority). By contrast, the former has been presented by 
retentionists as an intrusion into the domestic legal affairs of a state and a 
contravention of UN Charter Article 2(7), and as such challenges the legitimately of 
norm of state sovereignty of UN members (Kissack 2009). The long-term success of 
both cases depends on establishing in the first instance a majority of states willing to 
adopt a resolution, and in the second instance a gradual increase in the level of 
support beyond the simple majority needed to pass a resolution in the UNGA towards 
consensus. Thus the question turned to in the final section is why are non-EU states 
willing to support an EU-sponsored resolution,
22 and how can we explain the 
increasing willingness of more states to support it over time? 
 
III. Negotiating membership of the ‘Big Tent’ 
 
The first reason why non-EU states are willing to support EU-sponsored human rights 
resolutions is because they are in their own national interest. The concentric circles 
model of relations between EU and non-EU states is based on the assumption that 
those in nearest circles are ‘like-minded’ and national interests are more likely to be 
complementary and shared. For example, Mexico’s keen advocacy against the death 
penalty is partially explained by the disproportionally high number of Mexicans on 
death row in the United States, as a percentage of the total population of those 
                                                 
20 Syria read the ‘counter’ statement, as did Ethiopia, Russia and the Holy See. 
http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2008/ga10801.doc.htm (accessed 8 April 2009). 
21 Interviews, New York, 16 -20 February 2009. 
22 As discussed, the LGBT statement cannot be fairly labelled ‘EU-sponsored’, not least because it is 
disingenuous to the actual authors. However, opponents find it convenient to label statements and 
resolutions as EU-sponsored because it makes organising a unified position against it easier, as noted 
above in the comments concerning oppose first, reason why later.    14
sentenced to death. Similarly, the top five destinations for Filipinos working abroad 
are Saudi Arabia, Japan, Hong Kong, the UAE and Taiwan, of which only Hong 
Kong has abolished the death penalty. Both Mexico and the Philippines were among 
the ten co-authors of the 2007 death penalty resolution. Winning over each new 
member into the ‘big tent’ becomes progressively harder at the national interest of 
each state is more divergent from those of the EU core. Focusing on insight from the 
defence of the death penalty resolution from ‘wrecking amendments’ in the Third 
Committee, the EU must be able to demonstrate the most convincing arguments for 
why their position should be supported. Through the orchestration of responses to the 
various lines of attack, the EU (and its co-sponsors) demonstrated that within the 
rational discourse of the multilateral framework, they have the better-reasoned 
arguments. How significant is this approach in the construction and maintenance of 
the ‘big tent’? On the one hand no diplomat enters the Third Committee or the 
General Assembly without a national position on an issue as important as the death 
penalty or LGBT rights – there are no ‘undecided voters’ up for grabs. On the other 
hand, a number of theories tell us that discourse does affect outcomes in negotiated 
settlements over normative issues. I shall briefly consider three avenues of 
explanation drawn from the theoretical literature. There is insufficient space to 
analysis the role of the death penalty and LGBT rights in the bilateral relations 
between the EU and third states, nor the linkages between national foreign, 
development and aid policies and these issues, which are considered in Balfour (2006) 
and Lerch and Schwellnus (2007). 
 
The useful place to start is with Ian Manners seminal essay Normative Power 
Europe: A contradiction in terms, which not only considers the ability of the EU to 
shape norms by having the ‘ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in word 
politics’ but also specifically addresses promoting the abolition of the death penalty 
(2002: 253). To recap the central tenants of the thesis, Manners argues firstly that the 
debate between civilian power (championed by Duchene) and military power 
(championed by Bull) that has polarised the study of the EU in international relations 
actually have some important commonalities. These include firstly their ‘shared 
interest in the maintenance of the status quo in international relations which 
maintained the centrality of the Westphalian nation-state’, secondly their shared 
valuing of ‘direct physical power in the form of actual empirical capabilities’, and 
finally they ‘both saw European interests as paramount’ (Manners 2002: 238). The 
civilian-military power debate also has a natural tendency to slide into a discussion 
about the EU’s state-like qualities, or lack thereof. The second stage of the thesis 
argues that in the post Cold War world in which victory over the USSR was due to the 
‘collapse of [Soviet communist] norms rather than the power of force’ we should 
reflect ‘on what those revolutions tell us about the power of ideas and norms’ 
(Manners 2002: 238). The study of normative power Europe in the international 
system is appropriate in the post-Soviet world, and leads beyond the discussion of 
state-like qualities inherent in the civilian-military debate towards assessing the 
unique identity of the EU. Thus the third stage of the thesis considers how the unique 
constitution of the EU lends itself to being a normative power. Through the 
identification of five core norms and four minor norms located within the emergent   15
legal output of the Union,
23 the EU is able to ‘present and legitimate itself as being 
more than the sum of its parts’ and this is manifested in its intra- and inter- national 
relations (Manners 2002: 244). Manners presents the abolition of the death penalty as 
an example of the EU’s normative power agenda, arguing that while it is based on UN 
and Council of Europe norms, the EU took ownership of the norm itself and started 
promoting it in reference to its own moral and legal framework after it ‘was legalized 
through the Amsterdam declaration’ (Manners 2002: 252). He goes on to show how 
the abolitionist norm was firstly internalised among member states, then incorporated 
in the accession agreements of Central and Eastern states, and later adopted by states 
in the EU’s neighbourhood amidst the milieu of intensifying institutional dialogue. In 
the wider world, the EU ‘contributes towards raising the issue to the international 
level’ (Manners 2002: 248). Does this help to explain how the EU attracts support 
among the wider UN membership? 
 
‘Normative power Europe’ can certainly help explain why Europe is one of 
the densest spheres of support for the moratorium resolution, based on the fact that 
many states have already ratified the relevant Council of Europe (CoE) based 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Protocol 6 to abolish the death 
penalty. Manners argues that accession to the CoE was insufficient to bring about 
state ratification of Protocol 6, and only subsequent EU pressure to do so brought 
compliance, thus attributing the adoption of CoE laws to EU influence.
24 Thus within 
the European neighbourhood support for the UNGA resolution is likely to come as a 
result of prior normative action. Beyond the geographic scope of the CoE the EU has 
promoted its abolitionist norm through its bilateral and regional dialogue and ‘through 
its engagement with the “super-executioners”, China and the USA’, although he 
concedes that what ‘is self-evident about this engagement is the extent to which the 
EU is clearly not going to change the minds of the governments concerned’ (Manners 
2002: 248). The ambitions of the EU have been tempered in the UN system, as seen 
in the shift in focus from abolition to a moratorium. One of the biggest hurdles faced 
by the abolitionist camp is that the death penalty is not illegal under international law 
and is tackled in an optional protocol (no.2 of 1989) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. This is all the more a problem for Manners argument given 
the centrality of law within it, both in codifying norms at the European level that 
enables the EU to promote those norms externally, and in the EU’s demands upon 
neighbouring states that they demonstrate their commitment through accession to the 
ECHR protocol. What remains unexplained is whether arguing the EU position in the 
UNGA is a strategy worthy of pursuit. Perhaps this is no more than should be 
expected given the fact that, according to Manners, ‘the most important factor shaping 
the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is’ 
[emphasis added] (Manners 2002: 252). While the ‘ontological quality’ of normative 
power provides ontological security to the EU (Manners 2002: 252), it exposes the 
Union to hostility from other UN members who cite its ‘holier than thou’ approach to 
politics as a reason for distrust and resentment. For this reason we must look 
                                                 
23 These are: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the minor norms: 
social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, good governance (Manners 2002: 242-
243).  
24 Russia is one of the examples discussed by Manners, and it has voted in favour of the UNGA 
resolutions both years, despite being in Gowan and Brantner’s ‘Axis of Sovereignty’.    16
elsewhere for a useful theoretical framework to understand the EU’s argumentative 
strategy in the UNGA beyond its closest spheres of allies. 
 
Thomas Risse has theorised a ‘logic of argumentation’ in which ‘processes of 
argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion constitute a distinct mode of social 
interaction to be differentiated from both strategic bargaining – the realm of rational 
choice – and rule guided behaviour – the realm of sociological institutionalism’ (Risse 
2000: 1). He demonstrates how March and Olsen’s ‘logic of consequentialism’ and 
‘logic of appropriateness’ are complemented by the logic of argumentation. Risse 
uses Habermas’ critical theory of communicative action as a meta-theoretical 
framework and shows how some of the core assumptions of a ‘common lifeworld’ 
and ‘ideal speech situations’ can be relaxed to the extent that is applicable to world 
politics (Risse 2000: 14-19). Risse tackles the first criticism by rehearsing the 
constructivist explanation of the anarchical international system as an 
intersubjectively understood and experienced phenomenon. He also articulates a 
second line reasoning that ‘dense interaction patterns within highly regulated 
international institutions’ help construct common lifeworlds, of which the diplomat 
networks working on Third Committee issues in the UN is just such an institution. 
The second criticism is also dealt with by arguing that although power relations 
intervene to disrupt the assumption of an ideal speech situation, they do not explain 
outcomes of argumentation. Risse asserts that we can ‘still maintain that truth-seeking 
behaviour leading to a reasoned consensus is possible in international affairs’ (Risse 
2000: 19). He moves on to illustrate his example with an analysis of how human 
rights norms are socialised into domestic practice, noting three stages. Initially ‘norm-
violating governments not only deny the validity of the international norms but also 
ridicule their accusers as ignorant “foreigners”… [and] [m]any Third World 
governments engage in an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist as well as nationalist 
discourse at this stage’ (Risse 2000: 29). We have seen examples of this in the 
arguments presented by retentionist states. Over time and under pressure norm-
violating governments are forced into making tactical concessions and change their 
rhetoric to ‘no longer deny the validity of the international norm. … The more norm-
violating governments accept the validity of international norms, the more they start 
arguing with their critics over specific accusations (Risse 2000: 29). During this 
second stage ‘a discursive opening is created for their critics to challenge them 
further: If you say you accept human rights, then why do you systematically violate 
them?’ (Risse 2000: 32). Risse notes that the discourse shifts from being focused on 
validity claims toward being focused on interpreting law, and in our case it is the 
interpretation of international law around the UN Charter and existing HR law. 
Ultimately this results in a final stage in which state behaviour changes to 
accommodate the norm domestically, leading Risse to conclude that this demonstrates 
‘a process of argumentative “self-entrapment” that starts as rhetorical action and 
strategic adaptation to external pressures but ends up as argumentative behaviour […] 
as if they were engaged in a true moral discourse’ (Risse 2000: 32). In summary, for 
Risse, argumentation matters because it does bring about a change in national policy 
making through a change in identity and interests. In this sense it leads to substantial 
and robust human rights protection through an internalisation of the norms. This 
provides a means to understand the changing interests and identities of the states on 
the lower levels of influence around the EU position.     17
 
Frank Schimmelfennig has written extensively on ‘rhetorical action’ and 
‘rhetorical entrapment’ as a way of bridging the explanation-gap between rational 
choice and sociological institutional approaches to the study of decision-making in 
international organisations. As he says in relation to the EU enlargement from 15 to 
27 states: 
Although rationalism can explain most actor preferences and much of their bargaining 
behaviour, it fails to account for the collective decision for enlargement. Sociological 
institutionalism, in turn, can explain the outcome but not the input. To provide the missing 
link between egotistic preferences and a norm-conforming outcome, I introduced “rhetorical 
action”, the strategic use of norm-based arguments. (Schimmelfennig 2001: 76) 
Behind the puzzle of the decision to enlarge the EU that provides the case study, 
Schimmelfennig wants to bring the role of norms and legitimacy into the equation 
without buying the idea that actors interests and identities change as a result of debate. 
He wants to explain why actors are forced to behave against their interests, contra 
Risse who sees argument leading to a change in interests. Schimmelfennig’s 
‘rhetorical actors do not engage in a “cooperative search for truth” but seek to assert 
their own standpoint and “are not prepared to change their own beliefs or to be 
persuaded themselves by the ‘better argument’”’ (Schimmelfennig 2001: fn.55 
quoting Risse 2000: 8). The binding commitment on states to act against their self-
interest is derived from membership of a community that has its own legitimate 
normative framework, and when state action is demonstrated to at odds with 
community norms, deviant states are said to become ‘rhetorically entrapped’. All 
members of the community seek to frame their own interests in accordance with 
community norms and their opponents in contravention, resulting in ‘the strategic use 
of norm-based arguments’ (Schimmelfennig 2001: 62).  
 
To what extent is this model applicable to the EU’s argumentation in the 
UNGA? The much lower level of socialisation of member states to the norms and 
principles of the UN than the 15 EU member states to European institutions is not the 
problem that it would initially appear to be. According to Schimmelfennig, ‘rhetorical 
action presupposes weakly socialized actors’ and the theoretical purchase of the 
theory is that socialisation is insufficiently strong to influence state interests because 
‘it is not expected that collective identity shapes concrete preferences’ 
(Schimmelfennig 2001: 62). Thus the shift of focus from the EU to the UN is not a 
problem. However, in order for entrapment to take place and for naming and shaming 
to affect behaviour ‘actors are assumed to belong to a community whose constitutive 
values and norms they share’ (Schimmelfennig 2001: 62). The community places 
obligations on members (states) to behave in accordance to its ‘standard of 
legitimacy’, although they ‘do not take the standard of legitimacy either for granted or 
as a moral imperative that directly motivates their goals and behaviours. They 
confront the standard of legitimacy as an external institutional resource and 
constraint’ [emphasis in original] (Schimmelfennig 2001: 63). Within the UN the 
standard of legitimacy is more minimal than in the EU, where for example state 
sovereignty is the primary determinant of membership, but not on the type of political 
regime inside the state, or the geographic location, as in the EU. In the case of the 
death penalty, the debate between abolitionists and retentionists centred upon whether   18
the issue belonged within the Third of Sixth Committees, i.e. whether it was a human 
rights issue or a domestic legal question. By differing over the relationship between 
the death penalty and the UN Charter, states sought to ‘argumentatively back up their 
selfish goals and delegitimize the position of their opponents’ (Schimmelfennig 2001: 
63). The extent to which legitimacy matters is seen through the effectiveness of 
‘shaming’ those states that have ‘declared their general support of the standard of 
legitimacy at an earlier point in time’ (Schimmelfennig 2001: 64). Schimmelfennig 
carefully constructs his argument so as to demonstrate that ‘even if community 
members only use the standard of legitimacy opportunistically to advance their self-
interest, they can become entrapped by their own arguments and behave as if they had 
taken them seriously’ [Emphasis added] (Schimmelfennig 2001: 65).  In short, 
successful ‘rhetorical action silences opposition to, without bringing about a 
substantive consensus on, a norm-conforming policy (Schimmelfennig 2001: 65).  
 
Rhetorical action is an important tool for understanding the interaction 
between the EU and those states on the periphery of its circle of influence and those 
outside its sphere of influence all together. These states are not likely in the short term 
to change their national positions regarding progressive human rights standards such 
as the death penalty or LGBT rights. There is weak socialisation to the extent that the 
preservation of plurality between states (and differences on HR issues is an important 
loci of pluralism) is the primary social norm, manifested in sovereign autonomy and 
non-interference. However, for rhetorical action to work there must be an opportunity 
cost to being shamed in order for the community to have leverage over dissident 
members. The ability to label community norms as ‘imperialist’ or ‘western’ is an 
escape clause from rhetorical entrapment, thus making the regional constellation of 
co-authoring and co-signing states is important. Overall Schimmelfennig contributes 
to understanding how the EU can build a ‘big tent’ that while unable to accommodate 
all states, has a reliable way of silencing those who in the short and medium term will 
not adhere to the standard in practice as it is against their interests. This is the best 
that can be reasonably hoped for given the non-binding nature of UNGA resolutions 
on the law and practice of the member states. Nevertheless is provides the majority 
with the opportunity to pursue a progressive agenda unimpeded by the petitions of the 
minority. 
 
Each of these three theoretical perspectives sheds light on one part of the ‘big 
tent’ assembly process, Manners with the inner most circle, Risse applied to those 
predisposed to be generally sympathetic to arguments about HR norms, and 
Schimmelfennig explaining the more peripheral states that change neither their 
interests or identities, but become rhetorically entrapped. However, all of this assumes 
working within a Westphalian framework of sovereign states as the primary actors, 
under the fundamental institutions of international law and multilateralism as defined 
by Reus-Smit. Given the fact that modern nation-states are the core component of the 
UN system and that their mode of multilateralism is intergovernmental (compared to 
the supranational bent of the EU states noted by Laatikainen and Smith 2006), this is 
entirely appropriate.  
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However, there is another way of looking at the role of arguing in the UN 
context, taking as its departure point Reus-Smit’s foundational premise that the 
constitutional structures determine fundamental institutions. To what extent is it 
possible to reformulate the intersubjective normative elements that make up the 
constitutional structure? By showing that in ancient Greece all three elements took 
different forms we are made aware of their temporality, although Reus-Smit does not 
offer any thoughts on how they might change in the future. Reus-Smit demonstrates 
how the ‘norm of pure procedural justice’ is derived from domestic legal orders and 
their concept moral purpose that underpins their political organisation. In ancient 
Greece it was a process of justice through rational discourse towards the truth, while 
in the modern state is centred on the protection of property rights and liberal values of 
individual freedom. As advocates of a more just and equitable world order have long 
argued, there must be a recalibration of the notion of justice to become global in focus 
and solidarist in purpose. Such an intention to promote a new norm of procedural 
justice among the intersubjective constitutional structures will have repercussions for 
the other two components. The European Union has long been recognised as at the 
vanguard of redefining the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty, and as Manners 
has shown there are a core of norms at the centre of the Union that reflect solidarist 
principles beyond its borders, inter alia the Petersburg Tasks, human rights and core 
labour standard promotion, commitment to legislation combating climate change 
(Manners 2006). This preliminary sketch of the EU’s challenge to the constitutional 
structure of the modern sovereign state system is wholly consistent with Reus-Smit 
argument because as he says, we need to ‘facilitate systematic comparison across 
historical societies of states’ (Reus-Smit 1997: 556). How does this detour into meta-
theory help understand the role of argumentation in the UNGA? Argumentation, 
rhetoric and persuasion were central to the life of the polis in ancient Greece political 
society, where it was virtuous for free men to debate and sophists was held in esteem 
for their power to convince the ‘mob’, although Plato showed through Socrates that 
the pursuit of truth and the ability to win an argument were not always compatible 
(Plato 1979). The forthright defence of the values of the EU in the UNGA through the 
rhetoric and persuasion mimics a classical pursuit of justice in the ancient polis. 
Successful outcomes are based on the power of argument and the strength of the 
reasoning, as well as reiterating the fundamental equality of all parties present in the 
debate. Non-EU diplomats agreed with the view that it was preferable for the EU to 
promote its human rights agenda through the use of transparent argument in front of 
all UN members with the arrogant aloofness currently perceived by the Global South. 
One area for further research is the potential for a transformation of the fundamental 
institutions of modern international society into those reflecting a new constellation of 
constitutive structures, hinted at by the recognition that argumentation, persuasion and 
rhetoric are found across different historical societies of states and may be 
incorporated into future ones too.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This paper has made two arguments. The first is that while the dichotomy between 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘multilateralism’ may be a useful shorthand notation for the 
different positions of UN member states on the issue of human rights promotion, it is   20
theoretically inaccurate. Instead through the work of Ruggie, Kratochwil and Reus-
Smit sovereignty was shown to be consistent with multilateralism. It was further 
argued that multilateralism in the modern international system is the result of a 
specific set of historical processes and intersubjectively constructed societal norms 
between states. The second part of the paper analysed the newly emerging EU process 
of human rights promotion in the UNGA of building a multi-regional constituency of 
states supporting progressive HR norms, firstly through statements and then through 
resolutions. It was noted that one of the most important elements in explaining the 
successful outcome of these campaigns was the orchestrated defence of the resolution 
through carefully prepared arguments. The ‘power’ of argumentation was considered 
in three ways, as normative power (Manners), as the logic of argumentation (Risse), 
and as rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig). It was argued that each one contributed a 
level of explanation as to how the concentric circles of influence around the EU are 
influenced by the process of argumentation, according to the degree to which norms 
are pre-existing, willingly internalised at the national level, or remain unaccepted but 
unchallenged. The paper ended by suggesting that the use of rhetoric and persuasion 
in international organisations was compatible with the form of procedural justice used 
in ancient Greek between city states. While this does not signify a ‘return to the past’ 
within the fundamental institutions of the international system (Reus-Smit), it does 
make us aware of the possibility that future changes to fundamental institutions are 
possible and new conceptions of justice that feature more prominently solidarist 
human rights norms are also possible. The reconfiguration of the norm of sovereignty 
already underway inside the EU is a conduit for such change.    21
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